Former CIA Chief

Dulles Discusses Secrecy

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelli-gence Agency, broke a long silence with the publication of

a book-length article in the 1963 edition of the Britannica Book of the Year, published by Encyclopaedia Britannica,

Inc. Excerpts follow:
"On the whole, Americans are inclined to talk too much about matters which should be classified. I feel that we hand out too many of our secrets, particularly in the field of parucularly in the field of military hardware and weap-onry, and that we often fail to make the vital distinction between the type of things that should be secret and those which, by their nature, are not "had become the watchdog over the government and over the Communist party itself. Its most frightening power as an internal secret police lay in its authority to arrest, condemn and liquidate at the behest of the dictator his henchmen or even on its own cognizance, without any recourse to legal judgment or control by any other organ of government."

1 , 1 "It is no surprise, then, that the Soviet intelligence officer himself acquires a harsh, mer-ciless attitude. There is no better example of this than the story told about one of Stalin's intelligence chiefs, General V. S. Abakumov. During the war, Abakumov's sister was picked up somewhere in Russia on a minor black-marketing charge, or "speculation." In view of her close connection to a man as powerful as Abakumov, the police officials making the arrest sent a message to him asking how he would like the case handled. They fully expected that he would request the charges be dropped. Instead, he is reliably reported to have written on the memorandum that had been sent him: "Why do you ask me? Don't you know your duty? Speculation during wartime is treason. Shoot her."

"At its simplest, espionage is nothing more than a kind of well-concealed reconnaissance. This suffices when a brief look at the target is all that is needed. The agent makes his way to an objective, observes

Ex-CIA Chief Speaks Out

The former head of the Central Intelligence Agency says Congress already has enough control over the super-secret

government agency.

And, says Allen Dulles, the United States must realize it faces "an antagonist that has raised the art of espionage to an unprecedented height."

Mr. Dulles's comments will appear in a 41,000-word article in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica's "Book of the Year." Part of the article was made public Sunday and will appear in the April issue of Harper's magazine.

To claims that Congress, perhaps through a special committee, should exercise closer control of the CIA, Mr. Dulles

replied:
"I do not believe there is need for more controls on our intelligence work. . . Procedures have been set up—and have been functioning very well for a decade—whereby frames — they soon realized function of the executive

"The origins of the program go back to the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union, having carefully followed the progress made by the Germans with their V-1 and V-2 missiles, made every effort to gather together as much of the German developmental hardware and as many German rocket experts as they could get their hands on while they were conquering eastern Gerwere conquering eastern Ger-many. The Soviets also hired a considerable number of Ger-

the drawing boards and away soon a numerical summer who will had the drawing boards and away from the testing areas, and then sent most of them back home. While these people proved to be a useful source of intelligence, they had never been brought into contact with the actual Soviet development and could tell only what they are could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a could tell only what they are could be a coul and could tell only what they had themselves contributed."

"One cannot assume that a visition shulpni slanta

that even a short- or medium-range missile would have great value in their program to dom-inate Europe."

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our press is overzealous in

future diplomatic political well to recognize that in the every advantage of what we r available."

have 'estimated' that Khrushthev should choose the opening lay of the Unaligned Nations Conference at Belgrade in September of 1961 to announce man experts in addition to the world, without fore-those they seized and forcibly the gentleman's agreement on those they seized and forcibly deported.

"It is a mistake, however, to credit Soviet missile proficiency today largely to the Germans. The Soviets themselves have a long history in this field and developed high competency quickly. They never took the Germans fully into their confidence but pumped them dry of knowledge, kept them a few years at the drawing boards and away sould a way for the gentleman's agreement on suspension of nuclear testing. Yet, this is exactly what he did. In Cuba in October of 1962 Khrushchev presumably estimated that he could sneak his missiles into the island, but them and camouflage them and then, at a time of his own choosing, face the United States with a fait accompli. Certainly here he misestimated,

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way to an objective, observes it, then comes back and reports what he saw. The target App average of the ports what he saw. The target App average of the ports what he saw. The target Communist leader will act or a supplied of the ports of the ports what he saw that a community one would not of the ports of the port ALL APARTMENTS ARE Enloyable experience.